Excerpt from Flug Swissair 111, by Tim van BeverenPublished by Werd / Pendo Verlag Zurich and München, 2nd updated edition. Translated from German. Note: This is a draft translation of copyrighted material, generously provided by the author and used with his permission.
OUT OF PRINT
Chapter 6.
The "IFEN:"
The On Board Entertainment System. (G/p 188)
How a Milestone turned into a stumbling stone.
Swissair House
editor Alan Millen declared with flash and pomp, on March 1997, in the
company's internal SAirGroup News Paper:
<<Swissair Editors will consider the 24th of January as
a milestone day in the Company's history. If all goes well, the most modern and
up to date flight entertainment System ever, will be offered by Swissair on
board its aircraft to it's flying guests.>>
In the mean time, this modern high-tech Entertainment System that
Swissair built into its fleet of 16 MD-11 aircraft and 5 of its Boeing 747 Jets
in 1997, turned out to be a problem child.
Already at an early stage of
the investigation, Vic Gerden and his team had thrown a very critical eye on
this system, after charred wiring belonging to the "IFEN"
Entertainment System was found amongst the wreckage of the "Vaud".
During the investigation the certification of this system was critically
scrutinized.
Today it is still uncertain what sort of a role the system really played
in the accident of SR Flight 111. It is even questionable whether a true
culprit for this disaster, will ever be found with certainty.
The development of the
entertainment system, its purchase by Swissair and its certification and installation
in the aircrafts, are a sort of mocking example of how easy it is in Civil
Aviation, for such an element to turn into a risky and dangerous one,
regardless of the existence of strict
rules, regulations and security barriers.
The Prelude.
The idea of the Onboard Entertainment System
"IFEN" or (In-flight Entertainment Network) that is now unfortunately
sadly famous, comes originally from the
gambling paradise of Las Vegas. (U.S.A)
In this artificial sparkling world, in the middle of the Arizona desert,
a Russian immigrant family has managed
gambling slot machines for quite some time. These one armed bandits where meant
to entice gamblers to leave their money right at the entrance of the big
gambling halls of the casino's, well before they went and sat down at any poker
or roulette table. (G/p 189)
The principle is ingeniously simple and entails little to no risk of
loss for the owner of the machine. These gambling devices have been equipped
with software for quite some time.
These programs ensure that the owner is kept on the winning side, more
often than the player is.
Boris Itkis, the youngest off- spring of this family was responsible for
the development of these elaborate software programs.
His brother Michael had worked
for a few years in Los Angeles in a satellite-building firm.
Being an aeronautical engineer
Michael brought plenty of <know-how> into the family business. Father
Juri Itkis presented himself to the outside world, as the owner of the family
business <Fortunet>. As a
result of the experiences that the family had acquired in Las Vegas, they came
upon, what they considered to be a futuristic idea. They thought of developing
gambling machines that would be operable on board civil aviation aircraft.
By integrating gambling games into the on board entertainment system of
aircraft, they would no doubt keep a well known market for this type of pass
time, very happy on boring and tediously long transcontinental flights. The gambling
games would be part of a big selection of films for the flying customers or
would be a sort of <Video on Demand> structure.
The market leaders, in on board entertaining systems were Sony and
Matsushita. They already had various systems they had developed on the market
and they had improved greatly on them, with high-speed tech developments and
innovations, but they had no system available to market, that would literarily
turn an aircraft into a <Flying Casino>
It was exactly this <Gambler or Gambling> market that Mr. Itkis
wanted to conquer with hisFortunet project.
The idea was to install a
Computer Network that provided each aircraft seat with an individual
touch-screen with its own incorporated terminal.
However, right from the
beginning, this potential financial bingo and very interesting project was
faced with an immediate problem.
In many U.S. States the law
forbids gambling and the existence of gambling elements or machines. Therefore, any gambling element is
forbidden, on board U.S. registered
aircraft and foreign flagships flying into the U.S. air space and the air space
of these states.
Michael Itkis never the less, was absolutely convinced that this antique
train of thought would soon change.
In order to get the project of this system, even if it was only
temporarily underway, the Fortunet Company needed a potential client and
if possible this client should be from a foreign Country where they had no
gambling restrictions. (G/p 190)
At a certain point, contact was established with the Australian Airline QUANTAS
but the airline could not manage to be-friend themselves with the system. The
next Airline that was contacted and that started talks with Fortunet was
ALITALIA.
Fortunet had calculated its initial development costs
for the <IFEN> system to be around 70 Million Dollars. However this
calculation was far removed from reality. One-time partners and working
colleagues in this project, think that the effective costs of the <IFEN>
up to its certification, can have been double or possibly triple of what was
originally calculated.
During the undertaking of the
<IFEN> project, the Itkis family founded a parallel Company to
this one, which was called Interactive
Flight Technologies (IFT). This was
a Bearer Share Company with its home base in Phoenix, Arizona. Michael Itkis
became Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Director of IFT. His brother Boris was also employed as a
Director. The main shareholder of the Company was father Juri Itkis.
In October of 1994 a contract
for the exploitation rights was signed between Fortunet and IFT.
Fortunet handed over the worldwide exploitation rights to IFT as well as all
present and future Patent's, Copyrights, Company Secrets and their
corresponding know- how.
In exchange for this, Fortunet
would received a monthly payment of U.S. $ 100.000- from IFT until the year 2001.
The biggest hurdle had yet to be overcome. One now needed a competent and efficient system that could be
built into civil aviation aircraft and that could be approved and certified by
the corresponding aeronautical authorities.
Whenever a change is undertaken in an aircraft, it has to be approved by
the FAA. This also applies to individual pieces or components of structures
that are built into an aircraft, irrelevant of the fact whether it concern the
aircraft structure or its flight quality and safety.
There are two way's for a
manufacturer to obtain such a certification, that in FAA Jargon is called
<Supplemental Type Certificate> or for short< STC.>
One way is that, the producer works together with one of the specially
authorized FAA engineers, a so-called DER (Designated Engineer Representative).
This person advises the producing Firm in question and is also a link to the
ACO (Aircraft Certification Office), which is a parallel authority to the FAA.
The STC is then emitted through the FAA to the producer, after all the
corresponding documents have been checked out.
The manufacturer also has the possibility of going directly to the DAS,
which is the <Designated Alteration Station>. This is a specialty branch
licensed by the FAA and serves as a sort of extension arm. (G/p 191)
From last paragraph of page –190- to end of the
first paragraph of page –191- to be translated by Tim…
(G/p 191)
IFT decided in the spring of 1994 to have the IFEN System certified with
the help of a DER.
The engineering office of Ed Mlynarzik in Florida was contacted for this
purpose, as they were in possetion of a DER licence.
According to Mlynarzik the project was still in baby shoes when it was
presented to him in April of 1994. At
that time the family business had just acquired the software for the <Video
on Demand> and the one that was necessary for the fortune (gambling) games.
Working together very soon proved difficult for the two companies and
conflicts soon arouse between them.
Mlynarzik professional
Aeronautical Firm quickly came to the conclusion that the Itkis family had absolutely
no idea about what awaited them. As
complete new comers and strangers to the aeronautic world, they did not have
the slightest idea of all the requirements that were needed and that had to be
fulfilled, before the FAA would even remotely consider a certification of any
sort on anything.
Mlynarzik started off by giving the Itkis family the addresses of the
manufacturer of the <Black Chest> or the outer housing where the
different components of the system would eventually be installed. Then
questions started to arise as to, what sort of plugs and sockets would be used.
Mlynarzik advised them to use, the ones used most currently in aviation. Next
IFT decided to use specially sealed wiring, but then it turned out that it was
too heavy and was therefore no good.
All contact, in the initial
development phase was held primordially by telephone and this was an evident
handicap for the engineers. Mlynarzik and his staff of experienced aeronautical
engineers had problems dealing with IFT people. They had a special attitude
that was not necessarily compatible with the Mlynarzik staff. Every time we
made a suggestion, commented Mlynarzik, we had to hear the comment, >>We know more about this that you
do>> That was their general attitude.
It was very difficult to explain to them, (G/p 192) why there were certain things that could not be
done the way they wanted. They constantly changed things. What ever we checked
on Monday had been altered five times by Friday. We sometimes gave them
suggestions that just happened to be a bit more expensive and where immediately
asked why everything was so expensive. There were also problems at the
beginning with the general characteristics of the IFEN project. The original
idea was to have a high performance computer with a lap top shape built into
each passenger seat.
Right at the start of the project, one could fore see that this system
would be a big <power gobbler>-and Mlynarzik doubted that it would be
able to run on the ordenarry power supply of an aircraft.
At this phase of the project, just before the first inspection was
planned, the FAA in Atlanta began to busy itself with the IFEN project. The FAA
started to get suspicious and wanted to see the designs and drawings of the
project. They also had misgivings about the project, because it was a completely new system that nobody had
ever heard of before and that was being built by a completely unknown firm that
had no reference what so ever in the aviation world.
Also at this point, contact
between IFT and Mlynarzik broke off suddenly from one day to the next.
Mlynarzik on behalf of the FAA had requested information and data that he had
not yet received and was simply told by IFT that they did not see why they
should reveal any of the requested information and consequently did not do so.
The early ending of this partnership was, for Mlynarzik tedious and un-
satisfying but he was not surprised about the turn out of this brake up.
One day three Gentlemen turned up at his office as representatives of
the IFT Firm that wanted to pick up some documents that they had
delivered. Especially conspicuous where
two coloured Gentlemen that had flown in especially from Atlantic City –another
U.S gambling paradise- in a private jet.
These men, with tailor made suits and ponytails did not exactly look
like businessmen. Mlynarzik is convinced that these men were sent to him by IFT
to intimidate him and his co-workers. IFT apparently had some financial
problems.
(G/p) 193 ) Through a New York investor who had good
contacts with influential bankers, it was possible to find further funding for
this project. When Mlynarzik ended working in the IFEN project, there was no
talk of Swissair at that point yet and the system was still being developed for
ALITALIA. However, this deal somehow fell through and suddenly
Swissair was on the scene.
What is curious however, is a
press release in a Flight International Newsletter of the 12th of
December 1995 that says: << The IFEN entertainment system that is
produced by Interactive Flight Technologies IFT has been installed in the
"Magnifica" First/Business Class of a McDonnell MD-11 of ALITALIA.
Questionable is what sort of a certification the IFEN had at this point when it
was built into the ALITALIA aircraft, as there does not exist a STC in the FAA
data bank.
THE
JOKER.
With the Swiss Airline, the Itkis Family Clan eventually found an
enthusiastic potential client for their IFEN system. The then Marketing
Director for Swissair, Karl Laasner was very enthusiastic about the project and
immediately started to get the necessary wheels churning in order to overcome
all kinds of obstacles to make it possible to get the IFEN system implanted.
With smart publicity campaigns including publicity in internal company
publications, he managed eventually, to get the decision makers on his side.
They had initially been a bit sceptical about this whole IFEN project.
Here is a transcript of the Swissair Gazette of April 1997.
<< New IFEN arrival is cause for noise. To begin with, this new
entertainment system provides the up till now the unknown possibility of
individual freedom of choice. The days of imposed entertainment on board aircraft
are at last over and this thanks to the new technical sophistications that IFT
has built into their IFEN system. On the biggest yet Touchscreen, passengers
have a choice of 20 films, a big selection of Video Games and sixty hours of
non-stop music.
The big innovation in the system is the possibility to gamble at 30.ooo
feet, with a game limit of U.S.$ 3.500. (The losses are limited to U.S.$ 200-
in all of the three classes)>>
Karl Lassner took the whole of
the IFEN project under his wing and care.
He controlled all and everything that had to do with it. The first thing
that had to be done was to make the project appetizing to the management.
Lassner emphasised in all his presentations, the financial expectations of this
project and managed in the end to convince those he needed and wanted to.
(G/p 194)
In the Spring of 1996 the
first agreement was signed between Swissair and IFT. After this initial
agreement Swissair got the IFEN as a present from IFT. Financing of the costs
would be collected from the onboard gambling. How much of the decision making
was influenced by financial aspects, can be seen clearly in a further
communiqué in the internal SAirGroup newspaper of March 1997. Here Lassner sustains that: <<IFT will
undertake all the investment costs, of around 100 million Swiss Francs. This
amount will be written off with the proceeds from the systems gambling and
Video Games.
The agreement between Swissair
and IFT foresees that after the system is fully paid for Swissair will have full
owner ship of it. One therefore assumes that each aircraft has to cash in two
to three million Swiss Francs per year in order to make the system profitable
on a long-term basis.>>
That Swissair had intentions of
offering their guests on long haul flights and Jets a very big selection of
Video Games and Films and gambling in the air, soon made the media rounds and
was not picked up to well by the press. However Laasner immediately jumped up
in defence of his IFEN child.
On the 13th of June 1996 under the title Swissair News
and with the sub- title of <<Flying Casino? Wrong!>> the following
was published.
>> What we plan to do is to have an assortment of games like Bingo
or Lotto with a limited amount of money allotted to each game. These games
abide with the Swiss Lottery Regulations and are organised by the National
Lottery and benefit cultural entities.>>
In the mean time at IFT work was going on full swing on the finishing
touches of the system.
The maintenance checks for the Swissair long haul jets had been
pre-established a long time ago and one had to take advantage of one of these
overhauls that took three or more day, in the Swissair-Technics Hangars at
Zürich Airport to build the systems into the different aircrafts.
If any delays occurred they could
cost exorbitant amounts of money.
BINGO.
The IFT Project was executed in record time. Even for our modern times
where speed is a crucial element, it was finished extremely quickly.
Laasner kept everybody updated
on the progress of things. <<The Management signed the agreements in July
and six months later the system was already installed in the first aircrafts.
It is a remarkable fact that the construction and installation of a
complex system that has 680 different components, was put together in less that
one year by us, whilst other airlines have worked and invested in the same type
of project for over two years and have had no results to show for their efforts
up till now. >>
This statement could be found in the 1997 March edition of the SAirGroup
Internal News Paper. (G/p 195) This left the impression that Swissair
had in fact directed and pulled this project together on its own, whilst things
in reality were somewhat different.
In the middle of all this, IFT
had two other firms enter the game. In order to obtain a certification IFT
decided to hire the services of a DAS.
For this purpose, the services of the <Santa Barbara Aerospace
Company> located in the same named town in California were hired.
In the World Aviation Directory of the summer of 1997 this Firm
publicised itself with a big add stating that it was a Firm specializing in
heavy maintenance, the conversion of freighters and also being a general
engineering office for overall modifications and the obtaining of certification.
In connection with this, it is surprising to find out that this Firm was in the
summer of 1998 on the front pages of the press, because they had committed a
transgression.
The FAA was forced to fine the
Santa Barbara Firm U.S.$ 30.ooo because they had shipped <oxygen cylinders>
as freight on board a civilian aircraft.
Because of an identical incident to this one, a <Valujet DC-9> had
caught fire after take off and had subsequently crashed (see Chat.4)
IFT had another subcontractor in its pay roll. This was the Santa Fé
Spring in California <Hollingsead International> that also boasted the
ownership of an office in Salisbury in England.
The roll distribution in this
set up was very clear. Santa Barbara took care of the FAA STC and Hollingsead
took care of the physical assembly and installing of the IFEN system into the
various aircrafts. This Firm was also an FAA authorized and licensed
maintenance Firm.
The curious thing about all this was that; Hollingsead was non other
than Ed Mlynarzik, who had an FAA authorisation as a DER. With this Firm it was
thus possible to take care of the certification and the installation of the
System all in one and at the same time. FILL IN MISSING PARAGRAPH. //TIM//
Swissair wanted all the components of the IFEN system, to also have the
corresponding European certifications. Apart from this, each element or part of
the system had to comply with the specifications that had been agreed upon by
the two partners in question and they had to be approved by the FAA through a
STC. (G/p 196) This was the only way in which Swissair could be sure
that the European Aeronautical Authorities JAA and the Swiss BAZL would
recognize the IFEN system. The IFT had to also assemble and install the
equipments into the selected aircraft.
Karl Laasner, who by now had become the IFEN Project Manager, at times
applied undue pressure on the Swissair Technics Mechanics and consequently
problems arose between them and on occasions these problems turned into open
resistance on the mechanics part. One has to take into account here that for a
proud SR Technics mechanic or engineer, there can be nothing worse than to have
to watch how a foreign firm undertakes a major modification on their <beloved
planes> This is justified in as much that, as they are in charge of the constant
maintenance of the different aircraft, they know all the ins and outs of the
planes, and they also know what sort of
belly aches they have had during their flying lives.
<<None of the IFEN business was to our liking right from the
beginning>> admits a Swissair Technics Mechanic to the authors of this
book in a private conversation. <<Every time we dared come up with
something, Laasner immediately came along and blew all our ideas and suggestions
out into the wind.>>
The hearts of more than one old timer mechanic bled in the autumn of
1996 when, Hollingsead specialized assembly staff moved into the hangars at
Zürich Airport and in January of 1997 started to <<Deal With>> the
first Swissair MD-11. The aircraft in question had the registration HB-IWG and
was going to be used as the certification aircraft.
The suspicious Swissair Technicians were however too busy with their own
maintenance jobs to be able to constantly look over the shoulder of their
American colleagues.
Apart from the installation of the IFEN system there was also a regular
general overhaul to be undertaken on the aircraft, consequently there was quite
some turmoil in the otherwise very orderly aircraft hangars.
The SR-Technics project leader
Adolf Siegenthaler, described in the SAirGroup internal new paper
edition of January 1997, what the conditions in the hangars were like. <<
We were all under tremendous pressure because we had a time limit to comply
with. The development of the in-flight system had not really been finished yet and
right up to the last moment it was a bit uncertain as to whether we were going
to get the needed parts delivered from IFT in time.
At the same time we had 55 people belonging to the American installation
Firm that wanted to board the plane and start to get working. All this went on
next to our own mechanics, that were undertaking their normal, overhaul
mechanical duties.>>
This statement not only reveals the <hectic> that existed in the
hangar, due to the installation of the IFEN system. (G/p 197) It also reveals that the development of
the IFEN system was incomplete at that time, just before it had to be built in
to the first aircraft.
Consequently the following
question arises. How does one go about correctly certifying something that has
an incomplete invention process.? The
Santa Barbara office in California U.S.A that was in charge of this process was
however many thousands of kilometres away from the Swissair installation in
Zürich.
The answer to this question could eventually be found in 900 pages of
documents, that the authors of these writings managed to get a copy of from the
FAA after, a six months tug war under the <Freedom of Information Act
Request> In these documents various papers were found that showed that Santa
Barbara Aerospace had simply handed over some of its certifications to Hollingsead
and IFT.
Although not reprimandable, this
cannot be considered a very normal procedure. This meant that IFT practically
emitted its own certifications and that, in the name of the Santa Barbara Aerospace
Firm that was authorized by the FAA. However IFT did not manage to deliver all
the components with the specifications that had originally been agreed upon by
the two partners, with the corresponding certifications.
The building in of the monitors
into the aircraft seats was done directly at the seat factory< Recaro and
Rumbold> in their factories in Germany and England. Also for this the
corresponding STC was needed. This was emitted by the FAA ACO in Atlanta Georgia (U.S.A.) The seats
were then delivered to Swissair in Zürich. There the Hollingsead installer's
team built in the actual IFEN system components. There was for instance the
three-meter long and 170 kilo heavy <Equipment Rack> that held the
Calculating Interfaces and that stored the films. Hollingsead connected the
system to the aircrafts main power supply and then to the connecting sockets of
the Display in the seats.
When ever there where discrepancies, resistances or problems with
Swissair Technics during this phase, Karl Laasner immediately appeared on the
scene to put things back in order again and to speed things up.
So, the technicians of the home Firm were obliged to quietly retreat and
watch powerless how in "their" beloved MD-11 aircraft, a foreign team
of specialists assembled, laid and fastened cables and wire strips. They looked
on as work was done, that did not comply in the least with any Swissair known
standard of quality.
What turned out to be, even worse than the love less way that the sub
contractors installed the IFEN system, was the infringements that took place on
current wiring regulations and specifications that were based and established
on the experience of the aircraft builders and the FAA. This is how IFEN wiring
found its way into plastic pipe lines that where made out of Flurinited
Proby-Ethylene, that were already built into the aircraft. This type of
pipeline was later not to be found in the illustrated piece catalogue of
McDonnell-Douglas. (G/p 198) were all the authorized and certified
components of an MD-11 are catalogued and listed. Also this sort of pipeline
cannot be found in the FAA listing of authorized and certified aircraft
building materials.
These (empty) pipelines had been built into the <Vaud> at an early
factory stage.
All that Hollingsead did in effect was to use them, in order to bring
the power lines of the IFEN system from the cockpit into the cabin. Here again
one went against the established regulations, because, one put too small a
bundle of wiring into the much bigger sized pipeline. In certain cases chaffing
of the wiring can occur, especially in corners. (Half of this page has a
picture of the wiring installed in an aircraft.)
The IFEN wiring was installed somewhat hap-hazerdly. The wiring was
joined together by plastic rings to other existing cockpit wires. This was done
in open violation of established general regulations and was also undertaken,
completely neglecting the aircraft manufacturers specifications that do not recommend
the <marriage or union> of different types of wiring in one same bundle.
In this case one had <Tefzel> wiring from the IFEN system and
<Kapton> wiring from the aircrafts original general wiring that had been
put and clasped together.
As the outer isolation material of the <Kapton> wire is rougher
than, the softer <Tefzel> wiring isolation, chaffing can occur especially
in corners, due to the friction that takes place because of the normal
vibrations of the aircraft whilst it is in flight. (Se picture…)
(G/p 199) This page has a picture of wiring
in a plane.
More over, both IFEN wiring and original aircraft wiring
bundles had been sloppily brought along some sharp metal nicks and corners in
the passenger cabin. There were wires that were too tightly strung to the connecting
sockets, so that they were under constant tension and could have snapped off
any moment. There was also wiring that ran far too close to the
air-conditioning system.
What had also gone unnoticed apparently was that, parts of the IFEN
wiring where installed far too near isolation mats made out of <Mylar>
material. There were also wire guards missing on the securing clasps that are
there to help prevent wiring being squashed and getting damage.
Swissair in the end had to accept the installation as was, because all
of these violations, had room for different interpretations on behalf of
different parties. However, in no way did any of the wiring installation of the
IFEN system reach any of the regular Swissair standards of quality.
However, SR Technics eventually
did manage to cash in on a small <victory> It insisted that a non-planned
Test Flight take place, after the installation of the system had been
completed.
The MD-11 had to carry out a full-scale automatic flight and landing,
whilst the IFEN system was connected the whole time. The Swissair people feared
that possible disturbances could take place and that it could affect the very
sensitive electronic instruments of the aircraft. However the IFEN system
managed to pass this fiery test very well.
What is unclear however, is how IFT managed to test this system before
it was put into operation. No report can be found in the FAA records, showing
that any testing of this system had ever taken place anywhere.
On the 19th of November 1996 the Santa Barbara Aerospace Firm
emitted the first FAA authorized STC for the IFEN system. With this, there was
a document at hand, that also the Swiss BAZL could use for their own
certification. In this way, the installation and legalisation of the IFEN
system had been so to speak, "successfully completed".
Later on upon being questioned
about this, the BAZL admitted that, apart from this one <document> they
had not requested any other documentation for the certifying of this system.
They explained that the Swiss entity trusted the FAA entirely and their authentication
seal was after all very visible on the bottom left hand side of the document
that had been given to them. (See copy of document.) Glen Mills who worked as
coordinator for the Santa Barbara Aerospace Firm had signed the document and he
was no more no less than a delegate of the American FAA. However, he was not an
FAA official, as had apparently been assumed in connection with this matter.
IFEN project leader Karl Laasner had reason to rejoice. In the SAirGroup
internal newspaper edition of March 1997 one finds out why and how, the IFEN
system had been built and installed in record time. One of the reasons for the
high speed in the realisation of this project was that, as Swissair had its
D-Checks organized and pre-booked, one took advantage of this time that the
aircraft were on the ground to install the system. This not only saved time but
also about 20 Million Swiss Francs in <ground time.>
Now that all possible hurdles had been overcome and that the IFEN system
had been installed, one would think that Swissair and IFT would have started to
cash in heavily over the clouds. However, this apparently did not seem to be
so.
In the Swissair Internal newspaper edition of February 1997 one can find
under the title of <<Fokus>> a text that does not sound exactly
euphorical. << We are first testing the systems functionality on three of
our MD-11 aircraft and one of our Jumbo 747 and we also want to see what sort
of acceptance the system has with our passengers.>> (G/p 201 has picture of STC letter) (G/p 202).
To test the acceptance of the system with the passengers seemed a very
legitimate attitude and measure. However, how is one expected to interpret the
fact that, the system apparently was according to this statement still in a
<testing phase>. Did this mean, that paying guest where being used as
<testing rabbits> or <guinea pigs> to verify if the system functioned correctly, and as it
was originally designed to work.
Shouldn't such testing have taken place on the ground, in so-called
<Cabin Mock up's> before the system was installed in the real aircraft?
In Company's like Sony or Matsushita the testing of a number of things
such as, power flow and tension
measurements etc. in such a system, are undertaken during the development phase
and well before the system is finally finished or built into any aircraft. This
whole process can take up to two years.
With IFT this was not the
case. Swissair finally said that, what
they meant by <Test Phase> was, that they were testing the software
installed in the system.
Karl Laasner, who had in the mean time adorned himself with the title of
<Head of In-flight Communications and Telematics>, continued to
distribute further success <communiqués>
Two weeks after the system had been installed in a long haul Jet, and
had been presented for the first time to the passengers on key routes, he came
out and said.
<<One of the things that the Airline Management will surely not
have to worry about, is the system itself. Although we still have some details
that have to be solved and combed out, even the experts are surprised at the
trustworthiness that the system offers.>>
No mention was made of the small technical problems that arouse and they
where put down to <baby pains> One of them was for instance, that the
cabin temperature rose notably when a great number of systems where in use at
the same time. This was not at all surprising, if we consider that we had a
sort of < high-powered laptop> installed in every First, Business and Economy
Class seat. Never the less, Swissair
kept equipping more Jumbo Jets and MD-11 with this fancy new IFEN entertainment
system.
Rien ne va Plus.
Then suddenly in the Spring of 1997,
bad news arrived from Phoenix Arizona at the Swissair head office on the
Balsberg in Zürich. The producer of the IFEN system was running out of
financial air. IFT threatened to step
out of the project. Added to this was
the realization that, the passenger acceptance of the system, especially in
Economy Class (G/p 203) was not what one had expected. The income
from the Video games and the gambling was far beneath the initial projections.
It seemed that especially the Swiss passengers where either, too stingy by
nature, or perhaps too clever to waste their travelling petty cash on gambling
in the air.
Swissair and IFT had grossly miscalculated their potential income. IFT
had counted on their participation of the income of the in-flight gambling and
Video games and as the financial reality was nowhere near the initial
projections and was wrong by millions, they now had a serious gap in their
finances. Consequently the components that they still had to deliver by
contract to Swissair were in jeopardy of not being able to be delivered.
At this point Karl Laasner appeared on the Managements top floor with the
solution to this problem in his
pocket. Swissair would simply draw up a new contract with IFT and buy up the
whole of the IFEN system. For IFT there were few other options available at
hand. For Swissair not to accept this proposal was too much of a financial
risk, because if IFT went bank rupt, the situation could leave them without the
IFEN system for their planes. Not to
mention that they also risked loosing face in front of everybody.
The Swissair management had already decided that the new Airbuses, that
were being delivered in the Autumn of 1998, would be fitted out with these IFEN
Systems, consequently Swissair had to ensure the availability of the systems,
because in this respect, they wanted to have uniformity in their aircraft
fleet.
So with a somewhat heavy heart, the Swissair management eventually
decided to acquire the IFEN system for the (modest….) price of 46 Million Swiss
Francs and they signed the subsequent new contract with the IFT Management. In
this new contract that was drawn up, IFT continued under the obligation to
install the IFEN system units in the Swissair aircraft and they also continued
to be responsible for their corresponding certification.
The decision of the Swissair Management also involved the Product
Management department that relied on Karl Laasner. This could be seen in an
informative statement emitted by Beat Gmüder in <In-flight> magazine
edition of May 1997.
Thanks to the arrival of the Swiss funds, IFT'S financial survival was
ensured and the company was able to comply with its commercial commitments and
deliveries's and it was also able to pay off its debts with its subcontractor
Hollingsead.
Non-the less, the IFT shares fell sharply on the stock market. In June
1996 one share was worth sixteen U.S.$ (16) and the same share in the middle of
the next year had fallen to one (1) U.D.$.
In the time between the 20th and 21st of February
as also between the 21st of August and the 11th of
September 1997 the <Vaud> and other aircraft were equipped with the IFEN
System, however due to the low passenger acceptance, it was only installed in
First and Business Class.
The building in of the IFEN
system into the new Airbuses was something that Swissair pushed off
temporarily. Swissair Press spokesman,
Peter Gutknecht justified this action by telling <FACTS> Magazine the
following. (G/p 204) <<The IFEN system could or
might possibly affect the performance of the new aircraft. The systems
complicated electronics had not been properly tuned yet and it was only
certified for MD-11 Aircraft and had no certification for the for Airbus
aircraft type yet>>
What did Peter Gutknecht mean
when he said that the systems where not properly tuned.?
Where people at Swissair having their first doubts about the system. Was
this doubt born because they knew that the system was connected to the main
power source of the aircraft and that it depended solely on cabin power for its
operation and that this cabin power supply was apparently proving to be
insufficient?
In February of 1998 Swissair let the whole IFEN system from IFT drop and
ordered the well know and checked out equipment from Matsushita, for their new
Airbuses.
Karl Laasner however kept giving his IFT/IFEN system high praise. In the
SAirGroup internal News Paper he said
that: << The truth of the matter is that the competition is at least two
years behind in the development of these highly sophisticated systems, which
goes to show that Swissair is as always an "avant garde" Airline that
has all the latest innovations.>>
The middle of this page 204 has the man sitting
in the seat with the system.
(G/p 205)
Game Over.
Amongst the strands of wring that the deep-sea divers recovered from the
wreckage of the <Vaud> from the Atlantic Ocean seabed, they found burnt
connection cables of the IFEN system. This led the investigators to immediately
concentrate on the strand of wiring that led from the cabin into the cockpit.
It did not take long before it was found out that these wires were bound
together with original wiring from the MD-11. These where also found to have
burn marks on them. The investigators however, where unable to determine if
these IFEN wires were the ones that had caused the fire or if they just
happened to be in the way of the fire that had broken out due to some other, as
yet unknown causes. What experts were very surprised to find out was that, this
IFEN system was directly connected to the main power source or supply of the
aircraft or what is commonly called the <AC Bus Nr. 2>
Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas upon
being questioned about this said that; when ever they installed a system of
this type or of any other sort in their aircraft, they always did so,
connecting what ever system, to a separate individuld power source that
provided an individual power flow to the element in question, but that they
connected anything directly to the aircrafts electrical main power system. This
was the case fore instance, with the loudspeaker and lighting systems in the
main cabin, which had individual independent electrical connections. Boeing also said that the installers of the
IFEN system had never consulted them about the electrical connections or
problems with them, during the installation of the IFEN system.
Also the type of wiring used in the IFEN system left U.S. wiring and
cable expert somewhat bewildered. The wiring type <MIL 22759-16-12>
defines a special type of wire, which is very rarely used in civilian aircraft.
It was original developed and used in Military F-5 Fighter Jets.
However <Grumann> who had
originally produced this wiring, had it removed from the marked as early as
1982. He had at one point been very worried about very poisonous steam that
developed when this material burned.
What also has to be noted is, that this type of wiring has a heat
tolerance point of only 150 degree's Celsius and should therefore only be
heated up to a maximum of 110 degrees. This at least is what the American FAA
established in a written statement. (FAA –AC 43. 13. 18) When asked, IFT
refused cate gorily to answer any questions regarding this subject.
Bad Public Relations on behalf of Swissair made an already enormous loss
of 31.Million in 1998, even worse when the IFT shares collapsed to an all low
of 16 Dollar Cents per share. In October of 1998 the company made it more or
less publicly known that they were giving up the IFEN enterprise.
The Canadian NTSB investigators in Halifax now took everything that had
to do with the certifying process of the IFEN system, and threw it openly on
the table.
On the 28th of
October of 1998 a joint meeting took place between: Swissair, Boeing representatives,
members of the Canadian NTSB and representatives of the Swiss accident
investigations office, BAZL. (G/p 206) In this meeting the BAZL was
questioned regarding their opinion on the
<security of the installation of the IFEN system >.
The end result of this meeting was that, Swissair decided to completely
disconnect all the IFEN system's in their planes and to interrupt all and any
power connections to and from the system, immediately and until further notice.
One day later, the executive Vice President of operations, Beat Schär
announced in a written statement, that went into circulation amongst all of
Swissair's staff that: the IFEN System had been disconnected on all the 15
MD-11 aircraft and the Boeing 747 fleet. The reactivation or changing of the
present system was to be decided upon by the FAA and the BAZL further on. He
closed off his statement by saying that: <<We are convinced that our
preventive measures will in the long run have positive results and that these
measures are in keeping with our Company's values, goals and objectives.>>
On the 13th of November 1998, trailing some bourocratic delay
behind it, a BAZL statement arrived at the Swissair head offices on the
Balsberg. It stated that the emitted FAA- STC certifications of the Swissair
IFEN entertainment system had been cancelled as per immediately. In this way it
was now also no longer possible for Swissair to keep on operating the
entertainment system, as they had no certification for it anymore.
After this, more that one First and Business passenger wondered, when on
board, why they could no longer unfold their entertainment system screens out
of their arm rests. As the existing Swissair Boeing 747 fleet will leave
Swissair service in January of 2000, the system on this aircraft type will definitely
not be re-activated.
The End game.
Not only in Switzerland did
one react with heightened nervousness when there were indications that a
possible involvement of the IFEN entertainment system could exist in connection
with the SR111 crash in Halifax. Next
to the responsible people of IFT in Santa Barbara Aerospace and Hollingsead
International, there was also a Mr. Albert Lam who was having sleepless nights.
Mr Albert Lam was the person responsible, in the FAA ACO in Los Angeles
for the records of the IFEN STC file on the FAA side. Was there something there that he had possibly and perhaps over
seen.?
It was Mr Lam's responsibility to intercede, if during the certification
process something had seemed suspicious to him. Had he in effect, check out the
contence of all the documents properly, or did these files simply decorate the
shelves of his office.
After the crash of Flight SR111 there were many ladies and gentlemen
that belonged to the FAA that went hurriedly to their office cupboard's to dig
up the reports of <STC Nr. ST 00236lLA-D> which was the IFT IFEN file, to
quickly and quietly check it out again. (G/p 207) In these documents the
full-scale drawings of the system, that Santa Barbara Aerospace was using at
the time could be found. These files also held amongst other things, all the
details and steps of the systems certification process.
The authors of this book were also able to obtain a copy of all these
documents, which they then handed over to a one time FAA DER to have them
interpreted. This person could not believe his eyes when he started to check
out the documents, as there were some things that were not religiously the way
they should have been, according to FAA regulations.
In a so-called << Part Conformity Request>> on the FAA form
sheet "8120-10 " it is curious to see, that the established
conformity is given for <five> IFEN Systems. This is a very unusual
practice when the installation of a new prototype for only < one>
aircraft is concerned. One was apparently dealing with five different
certifications, for five different prototypes of the IFEN system –or at least
so it seemed.
Before the system could be installed in <series> in other planes,
the STC holder (Santa Barbara Aerospace) as well as IFT (Hollingsead) needed to
have a PMA <Parts Manufactoring Authority> However it seems that this
PAM, was not obtained.
Consequently one asks one self the question: What happened to the other
four prototype systems, after the first one was built into the MD-11 HB-IWG in January of 1997?
If things had been done correctly, the other four systems should have
been returned to the FAA in order to get them a new PAM. After this they would
have to then be completely and fully certified again from scratch, before they
could be built into any other aircraft. By doing this, one also ensures that
the correct design is used and that it's correctly certified. Possibly the FAA
allowed the other <prototype models> to be installed in some other
aircraft, but no documentation to this respect has ever been found.
IFT Co-worker Frank Gomer sustains to this respect, that the PAM for the
prototypes were handed over to Santa Barbara Aerospace on the 20th
of February and on the 18th of April 1997.
What is strange about this however, is that contrary to general
practice; there is no registration regarding this hand over in the FAA database
up to October 1998 and it gets updated on a monthly basis.
When one confronted the FAA with this, they gave a written explanation
saying that: << there existed no unusual situation, because in the
emitting of the STC there were various Swissair aircraft involved>> This
statement is surprisingly, a contradiction to the FAA'S own rules in Form Order
81104ª, that explains exactly how one should proceed when emitting an STC.
German pages 208, 209, 210, 211 and 212 till
"Revanche" are IFEN pages for Tim.
( G/p
212)
REVANCHE?
On the 8th
of May 1999 attorney Timothy J. Thomason handed in a claim against Swissair the
Airline, SR Technics and the SAirGroup at the District Court in Arizona for 100
Million Dollars. His client is IFT and the claim is amongst other things for
Breach of Contract. The written claim is as thin as the arguments within it.
Some facts are wrongly interpreted or, they have purposely been wrongly
presented, as for example that IFT claims that they had entrusted SR Technics
with the correct installing of the IFEN systems. According to the contract it
was established that this duty fell upon the shoulders of the IFT people.
Swissair claims that, they had been promised a fully functional,
operational and certified system from IFT. The allegation on behalf of the IFT
lawyer, that Swissair owes IFT money, is according to the Swissair lawyers, wrong.
All the financial agreements were honoured according to what was established in
the contract, that these two party's had signed.
Should this point ever be taken to trial, it would be interesting to see
what proof IFT would provide against Swissair. (G/p 213) The decision of
the Airline to discontinue the use of the system is in any case, was backed by
the fact that the BAZL had removed its certification. The system also had a possible
" cause of accident" pending with the NTSB in connection with the Swissair
Flight 111 crash.
Insiders of the American law scene interpret the IFT claims as: a not
very successful attempt at avoiding damage claims from the crash victims next
of kin, under the motto <<attacking is the best defence>> and also
the thought that this tactic would help to calm down investors and share
holders after their disastrous stock- market loss.
One heard shortly about IFT again in the Spring of 1999, this in
connection to a British Lotto Firm and a Telephone Company. Interesting is that, total silence reigns on
the Itkis brothers and father front. They retreated quietly from the IFT scene
quite some time ago.
Dented Cards.
What went on underneath the table with the certification of the IFEN
system? Was Santa Barbara Aerospace lured into the trap of a lucrative deal?
Did they neglect the duties they had been entrusted by the FAA? Did one
intentionally close both eyes on critical points and issues?
These are all questions that will have to be answered during the course
of the different lawful procedures that will take place in the future. In any
case, this is a special subject that the Americans have awoken to and have
suddenly become aware of.
During the course of an internal Swissair investigation, the Company's
Marketing Director, Karl Laasner was called in to give an explanation on this
matter. When he was questioned, he admitted having acquired IFT shares, as in
that way he would have been able to participate in the Company' profits. It was
unlucky for Laasner, that the project with Swissair was a total flop and that
the shares now were not worth the paper that they were printed on.
Swissair accused him of doing <insider business> He explained in
his defence, that he had acquired 2700 IFT Shares for 11 U.S Dollar per share.
His stock market broker had bought the shares for him, the day after Swissair
decided to obtain the system on the 29th April 11996 and that this
procedure was legitimate and legal. He still owns these shares today as he
claims that he is still totally convinced by the system. (G/p 214)
This behaviour also explains why Laasner was so determined and
enthusiastic about the system.
If, apart from Swissair other airlines had bought the system, he could
have made an appreciable amount of money, by owning the IFT shares. However,
all this makes other questions crop up.
Did he in any way try to influence the signing of the deal? Did he get a
kick back for the signing of the deal from IFT? Did he know, when the contract
was signed between Swissair and IFT in the summer of 199, that IFT had
financial problems? Did he pass on internal information to IFT about the dates
of the C-Checks on the Swissair aircraft? so that they could –just by chance-
have the systems ready for installation in time? Did he manipulate the take over of the system to save it from bankruptcy?
Pondering over the question, < what sort of a card was played with
this system> on both sides of the Atlantic, many will be kept busy figuring
this out for quite some time…